Abstract: Some basic ideas underlying the EU project IFATIS (intelligent fault tolerant control in integrated systems) are described. Faults in the plant (controlled system) as well as in the controllers (computer systems) are taken into account. Plant modules and controller modules are considered as resources. Needed application functions (partial processes) are to be allocated to such resources to run in a normal or degraded mode. In case of fault induced resource reduction, resource managers on different levels can take care of arbitration and allocation, thus providing for unrestricted continuation or graceful degradation. Some outlines concerning implementation and hardware/software architecture are presented. Copyright © 2002 IFAC 
TERMINOLOGY AND PROBLEM STATE-MENT
The physical equipment of a control system consists of the plant (controlled system, including sensors and actuators) and the controllers (typically computer systems, including process I/O and communication subsystems). Parts of the equipment are equipment units, composed of equipment modules. Hence, equipment units and modules can be plant units and modules or controller units and modules.
From a functional view, a technical process runs on the physical equipment for the purpose of transformation, transport or storage of material, energy or information (DIN, 1994) (in this section "or" is always an inclusive or). Sometimes, several different processes can run sequentially or simultaneously on the same plant. Process types are continuous, batch, or discrete parts manufacturing. A whole process can be divided into partial processes as functional units.
Such a partial process fulfils a specified purpose within the whole process and runs on a set of physical equipment modules, plant as well as controller modules.
A partial process includes its control functions. Control provides for a specified behaviour within specified limits. Typical control functions (in a wide sense) are measurement, regulatory control, logic control, sequential control, as well as HMI (human machine interface) and higher level functions. Control is done by executing software modules on physical controller modules.
For batch control, a standardised terminology is defined (IEC, 1997) . But, unfortunately, some of these terms make sense only for sequential processes and hence cannot be used in our general case.
Safety and reliability requirements play an increasing role in system design. Possible aspects are:
• fault avoidance by using qualified specification and design methods for hardware and software, and by choosing reliable components. • fail safe behaviour, i.e. falling into a safe state in case of faults, when a safe continuation of the process cannot be guaranteed (provided a safe state exists), • fault tolerance means a continuation of the process within specified full or degraded quality in spite of a fault. This can be attained by static (passive) measures like robust or adaptive design or by redundancy or diversity or by dynamic reconfiguration of used plant and controller modules and their control functions.
In the past, the computer science community has primarily dealt with faults in hardware and software of computer systems, whereas the control science community had its emphasis on faults in the plant (including sensors and actuators) as part of regulatory control loops.
Large real control systems are built by buying and integrating many plant and controller equipment components ("integrated systems"). System design concerning safety and reliability has to take into account faults in plant as well as in controller components and has to realise that control is not only regulatory control. This necessitates a holistic approach for design and implementation.
BASIC IDEAS OF FAULT TOLERANCE IN INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEMS
Robust or adaptive design, e.g. for regulatory control, at most modifies controller parameters or algorithms, but does not change the set of used plant and controller modules and is not considered here.
In practice, due to its additional cost, explicit redundancy or diversity is confined to cases, where it seems really necessary for economic or for safety reasons. It necessitates fault detection of a module and switching to another module.
Large control systems often contain implicit redundancy or diversity such that the same or a similar functional effect of a partial process also can be obtained by a reconfiguration in the sense of using other equipment modules. Some examples, all requiring certain preconditions, may explain it:
• For dosing, instead of integrating the flow, the level change in the target or in the source vessel can be used.
• Instead of a measurement, a physical state can be estimated using models or observers.
• If, caused by a serious fault or damage, the rudder of an aircraft fails, the course could be influenced by a thrust difference between left and right engine. In that case, the change of actuators and plant dynamics requires different controller algorithms and parameters and different process I/O.
• In a batch process, faults in the range of a reactor vessel and its equipment could be overcome by allocating another reactor, but thus influencing the future schedules.
• The high processing power of modern processor units is often used by several concurrent control tasks. In case of a processor unit fault, these tasks can be executed by other processor units, provided that these processor units have connections to the needed process I/O, and there is enough remaining processor power for all necessary control tasks, eventually in a degraded mode.
The basic idea to cover all these cases is to regard the pool of plant modules and controller modules as resources, which can be allocated to the partial processes. If a module fails, a partial process possibly can be maintained by allocating different resources to it. Due to restrictions in the remaining processor power, or due to missing communication connections or faulty plant modules, frequently not all partial processes can continue in their full normal mode. Some less important could be stopped; others could switch to a degraded mode with reduced resource needs. These decisions are made by resource and reconfiguration managers in different levels, based on resource states, the urgency of partial processes in different modes, and their resource needs. Figure 1 shows the corresponding overall structure. Its blocks are explained in the following.
Each partial process consists of plant functions, running on plant modules, and (fault-tolerant) control functions, running on controller modules. To run, they need allocation of resources, i.e. plant modules respectively controller modules. This allocation is dynamic, dependent on mode and reconfiguration decisions of higher levels (e.g. group and global resource and reconfiguration managers). These decisions can change sensor and actuator information, which is exchanged between plant functions and control functions.
A FTC function (fault tolerant control function) is a functional unit. Its implementation, a FTC module, contains all software implemented parts (programs and data) belonging to exactly one partial process. A FTC function is independent of varying controller module allocation and storage location. The details of a FTC function are shown in figure 2. It consists of the following parts:
• Control function (measurement, regulatory or logic or sequential control, HMI, etc.).
• Function monitor for evaluation of the partial process quality and for partial process specific fault diagnosis. The latter can be based on sensor and actuator signals, analytical or knowledge based process models, and quality evaluation. • Local reconfiguration and mode control. From diagnostic results of the function monitor, local reconfiguration decisions can be derived, e.g. change of control parameters or algorithms, switching to redundant sensors or to estimated states, change to a degraded mode. Such decisions can be made locally only if the change of resource needs has no significant influence on other partial processes.
• Resource needs. Each partial process has specified resource needs and urgencies, which are different for each of its modes. This information has to be stored. Independent of its storage location, it is considered as part of the FTC function due to the above given definition of a FTC function.
A resource module consists of a resource, i.e. plant module or controller module, and an associated resource monitor.
A resource monitor is associated to a physical resource (plant or controller module) and monitors its state. In contrast to a function monitor inside a FTC function, it cannot be related to a partial process, because partial processes can be allocated to different resources. Sometimes, a resource monitor uses normal sensor and actuator information together with models, and hence it can be allocated to different computing resources, just like a FTC function. But sometimes resource monitors contain special hardware equipment or hardware associated test software, giving resource specific information (e.g. in computers: self-test software, parity check, watchdog). In that case, the resource monitor contains parts, which have a fixed allocation to a physical resource and hence cannot freely be allocated.
Group and global resource and reconfiguration managers are described in section 3. They also need allocation of computer resources.
HIGHER LEVEL RESOURCE AND RECON-FIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Local reconfiguration and mode control inside a FTC function, as described in section 2, is only possible, if there is no significant change of resource needs with influence on other partial processes.
Decisions concerning several partial processes have to be made on higher levels. As an example, figure 1 shows two higher levels: Each group resource and reconfiguration manager is responsible for a defined subset of partial processes, whereas the global resource and reconfiguration manager is responsible for group exceeding decisions. • Urgencies of each mode of partial processes. The urgency of a mode describes, how important it is to continue that partial process in that mode. At least a degraded mode of a safety critical partial process will have a very high urgency, whereas the full mode has a lower one. A less important partial process, e.g. serving only for more comfort, will have a low urgency.
• Connection information. This describes the connections between resources and their possibilities to work together. E.g. a certain processor could have connections only to a limited subset of sensors or actuators using process I/O channels or field bus lines.
Whenever the actual set of available resources doesn't suffice to run all partial processes in their preferred normal mode, there is need for a dynamic decision, in which mode each partial process should run, and which resources are allocated to it. Criteria for this decision have to be found. In fact, this is a multi-criteria optimisation problem with constraints. Considering real-time requirements and practical aspects, a sub-optimal solution is sufficient. Different intelligent methods can be used to find such a solution.
The mode and allocation decisions are reported to the FTC functions. There, the local reconfiguration and mode control takes care of switching to a different mode and of reconfiguring for a use of different resources. In general, this means a change of algorithms and parameters. Also the dynamic effects of switching have to be considered.
Two additional remarks for clarification: Typically, the same physical equipment module can be shared by several partial processes. Higher level resource and reconfiguration managers are implemented by software and hence can be allocated to controller modules.
STATE OF THE ART IN FAULT TOLERANT COMPUTING
Highly dependable programmable electronic systems for safety critical control and regulation applications form a specific domain of computer control systems, which has not been scientifically treated to a satisfactory extent, yet. Its significance arises from the growing awareness for safety in our society on the one hand, and from the escalating technological trend towards program controlled automation devices on the other. The aim is that computer based systems can be constructed with a sufficient degree of confidence in their dependability.
The programming practice prevailing in developing process control systems is characterised by the use of inadequate means. As a hardware platform for process control, usually general-purpose microcomputer systems, which are designed for an average application and without much provision for a safety critical one, are used. In programming, the implementation languages do not fulfil the requirements of the licensing authorities, which are for that reason reluctant to issue the safety license for a reasonably scaled program based control application (Halang and Frigeri, 1998) .
In order to properly design a safety related control system, the hazard (one or more of the techniques: FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, HAZOP Hazard and Operability studies, ETA Event Tree Analysis, FTA Fault Tree Analysis) and the risk analyses (to determine the required level of integrity) are carried out. This is base for further design decisions.
Throughout the design, process verification and validation are performed. To allow rigorous proving, formal methods should be used. At present, however, it seems that many formal methods are still immature and have limited tool support. For that reason, these measures cannot guarantee the correctness of larger programs with mathematical rigour (Storey, 1996) .
To cope with the situation, more pragmatic techniques are often implemented. The most common means for the improvement of fault tolerance usually found in control systems is "X out of Y redundancy": the voting and redundancy capacity of a safety system. The most commonly used is TMR, Triple Modular Redundancy, in which the voter detects and eliminates a failure of one out of three redundant resources. For best safety, the resources should be designed diversely to prevent common-mode failures.
Sometimes, a safety instrumented system (SIS) is used as the last resort: a robust and simple system composed of sensors, logic solvers, and final control elements for the purpose of taking the process to a safe state when predetermined conditions are violated.
In 1998, the IEC 61508 (IEC, 1998) standard has been accepted. It is an international standard that addresses functional safety of electrical, electronic and programmable safety-related systems. IEC 61508 deals with technical and non-technical requirements. It is performance based: the level of the requirements that need to be fulfilled depends on the required performance of the product. The performance is measured in safety integrity levels (SIL). There are 4 SIL levels (SIL 1, 2, 3, and 4), SIL 1 being the lowest and SIL 4 the highest category. The actual SIL level that a product needs to meet, depends on the results of the hazard and risk analysis carried out for the equipment/process that needs to be controlled by the safety-related product. The IFATIS project falls into SIL1, where consistently designed programmed devices can be implemented.
IMPLEMENTATION OUTLINE
The logical control system architecture as shown in fig. 1 is mapped onto the multiprocessor distributed hardware architecture. It is based on a hierarchically organised communication bus system.
There are two levels of interconnection, the lower level connecting FTC functions and resource monitors, and the higher level, which manages them. In order to avoid bottlenecks and to provide for better temporal predictability of data transfer, the two levels are physically separated.
On the lower level, a field bus (or a system thereof) is connecting different and possibly diversely designed processing resources and process peripherals (like sensors and actuators). An example of mapping of FTC functions and resource monitors upon it is shown in Fig. 3 .
As can be seen from the figure, sensors and actuators are as a rule independently residing on the field bus, thus allowing system reconfiguration. This may not be reasonable in the case of peripherals tightly coupled with processing units, e.g. in the case of specific resource monitors (RM2 in the figure) . Sensors and actuators may further include certain intelligence to process the raw data in order to minimise communication and to reduce load of processing units.
A FTC function can be mapped onto one or more processing units, sensors and actuators (FTC1), or can share a processing unit with more FTCs (FTC2 and FTC3) . This is particularly convenient in a case of tightly coupled partial processes. It can also share a processing unit with a resource monitor, which in this case has immediate access to its internal states.
To provide for the necessary system integrity, the mapping is not static but can be reconfigured in case of faults. Control functions, as well as monitor functions and other blocks of the FTC functions and resource monitors, are executed on the resources that were proven faultless. The reconfiguration is managed by higher-level managers based on the information from the function and resource monitors. Alternative or redundant resources are employed, if available, or the system's performance is degraded gracefully in order to survive the situation.
On the higher level of the hardware architecture, which is not shown in Fig.3 , the dedicated group and global resource and reconfiguration managers are controlling the overall structure and configuration of the control system. Over a separate network they are receiving the state information from the processing units and resource monitors and providing the commands for their reconfiguration to them (D, N and M from Fig.1 ).
In the hardware design, care will be taken in selecting proper processing and peripheral devices. To prevent common mode failures, the resources should be designed diversely, offering also different levels of quality of service; generally, the simpler systems should provide higher level integrity. For the ultimate safety, simple automata could also be available as a last resort to provide for fail-safe behaviour in the case when the system encountered a non-recoverable failure.
In order to support for better flexibility, the system software on the processing resources should support multi tasking. E.g., if a FTC function is mapped onto a single processing unit, the latter should execute the control and the monitoring functions in parallel. For simpler systems, even more FTC functions and/or resource monitors may be mapped jointly onto the same physical unit.
Whenever possible, for multitasking the principle of time observation should be preferred to event observation. I.e., cyclic operation is preferred to interrupts. This approach guarantees better temporal predictability and safety in case of missed events. For that reason, round robin or time-sharing task scheduling techniques are preferred to priority based ones.
CONCLUSION
Safety and reliability play an increasing role for many processes. In the typical case of high complexity, singular academic methods are not sufficient. Instead, a holistic approach is needed for design and implementation. Especially, ideas from computer science and control science have to be brought together and have to be adapted to real practical problems.
This paper describes some basic ideas in that direction. These ideas are to be investigated in more detail in the EU project IFATIS (Intelligent Fault Tolerant Control in Integrated Systems). The methods and tools to be developed in this project are expected to be useful in many different applications.
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